Saint Louis University Law Journal
Volume 46
Number 4 (Fall 2002)

Article 6

9-24-2002

Party Poopers: The Supreme Court Overlooks the Party in Federal
Election Commission v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign
Committee
Amanda G. Altman

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Amanda G. Altman, Party Poopers: The Supreme Court Overlooks the Party in Federal Election
Commission v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee, 46 St. Louis U. L.J. (2002).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj/vol46/iss4/6

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Saint Louis University Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For more information,
please contact Susie Lee.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

PARTY POOPERS: THE SUPREME COURT OVERLOOKS THE
PARTY IN FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION v. COLORADO
REPUBLICAN FEDERAL CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE

I. INTRODUCTION
It is often said that a chain is only as strong as its weakest link; if this is
true, then a recent decision of the United States Supreme Court proved just
how weak its rulings are in the area of campaign finance. In a 5-4 decision, the
Supreme Court, in Federal Election Commission v. Colorado Republican
Federal Campaign Committee,1 upheld limits on the amount of money a
political party could spend on the campaigns of its candidates.2 The decision
marked only the second time the Court has ruled on the constitutionality of
campaign finance laws with respect to political parties.3 In reaching a decision
in the case, however, the Court overlooked several important issues relating to
political parties, resulting in a generally disappointing opinion plagued with
weak links in its reasoning.
The provision at issue in Colorado II was part of the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1974 (“FECA”), which set limits on contributions made by
individuals, political parties and political action committees (“PACs”).4 The

1. 121 S. Ct. 2351 (2001) [hereinafter Colorado II].
2. See id. at 2371.
3. The first time the Court ruled on this point was in Federal Election Commission v.
Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee, 518 U.S. 604 (1996) [hereinafter Colorado
I].
4. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263
(1974). As early as 1906, Congress recognized the need for campaign finance reform, and
between that time and 1966, it enacted various statutes, which together, sought to: (1) limit the
disproportionate influence of wealthy individuals and special interest groups on the outcome of
federal elections; (2) regulate the spending in federal election campaigns; and (3) deter abuses by
mandating public disclosure of campaign finance. See Federal Election Commission, The FEC
and the Federal Campaign Finance Law, available at http://www.fec.gov/pages/fecfeca.htm (last
visited Jan. 5, 2002). In 1971, these laws were consolidated into the Federal Election Campaign
Act of 1971. See id. The 1971 Act, though more stringent than any previous attempts at
campaign finance reform, was difficult to enforce because there was no central administrative
authority. See id.
Later, the FECA was amended in response to the July 1972 burglary of the Democratic
National Committee in the Watergate Apartment complex and the events that ensued, including
the resignation of President Richard M. Nixon in 1974. See id. Although Nixon was almost sure
to win his bid for re-election in the 1972 Presidential race, his advisors formed the Committee to
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Supreme Court had its first opportunity to rule on the constitutionality of the
FECA in 1976 in Buckley v. Valeo.5 In Buckley, the Court sustained the limits
on individual contributions,6 but held that limitations on campaign
expenditures, independent expenditures by individuals and groups, and
expenditures by a candidate from his personal funds were unconstitutional.7
At first glance, the holding in Buckley seems simple to understand:
contribution limits are constitutional, while restrictions on expenditures are
unconstitutional. A problem arises, however, because the Act’s definition of a
“contribution” includes “expenditures made by any person in cooperation,
consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate,
his authorized political committees, or their agents.”8 This effectively makes
an expenditure that is coordinated with a candidate a contribution for purposes
of the Act.9 “In general, FECA treats all money spent by an individual or
organization in coordination with a candidate as though it were a direct
contribution to that candidate, subject to the Act’s contribution ceiling.”10
Therefore, under Buckley, limits on independent expenditures—those not made
in coordination with a candidate—are unconstitutional, while contributions and
coordinated expenditure limits are constitutional.
Political parties, however, are not covered under the general provisions of
the Act.11 Instead, Congress adopted the Party Expenditure Provision.12 The

Re-elect the President, a committee later known as CREEP. See The American President,
Richard Nixon: The Comeback President, available at http://www.americanpresident.org/
KoTrain/Courses/RN/RN_Campaigns_and_Elections.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2002). The
committee raised hundreds of thousands of dollars from corporations promising payoffs of
favorable legislation and ambassadorships in return. See id. The committee used the money to
pay off political con artists and dirty tricksters. Nixon and the White House were not linked to
the burglary until later, and the President won the election in a landslide, but reports of serious
financial abuses led Congress to amend its campaign finance laws. Not only did the 1974
amendments set contribution limits, they also established the Federal Election Commission
(“FEC”) to enforce the provisions of the FECA. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974).
5. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
6. The individual contribution limits the Court discussed included limitations on
contributions by individuals and groups to candidates and authorized campaign committees,
contributions by political committees, and limits on total contributions during a calendar year.
See id. at 1-2.
7. See id. at 143.
8. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(7)(B)(i) (1994).
9. See Colorado II, 121 S. Ct. 2351, 2357 (2001). Various limitations on contributions are
established for individuals and political committees in the FECA.
10. Richard Briffault, The Political Parties and Campaign Finance Reform, 100 COLUM. L.
REV. 620, 625 (2000).
11. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(A)-(B) (1994).
12. Id. § 441a(d)(3). See also Kirk J. Nahra, Political Parties and the Campaign Finance
Laws: Dilemmas, Concerns and Opportunities, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 53, 91 (1987) (noting that
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provision places limitations on the amount political parties may spend in
connection with their candidates for the office of President and for other
federal offices.13 In its last term, the Supreme Court examined the
constitutionality of the limitations imposed on a party’s coordinated
expenditures when it decided Colorado II.14 The case arose out of a senatorial
election in Colorado. The specific provision at issue provided that in elections
for the United States Senate, each national and state party committee, “[m]ay
not make any expenditure in connection with the general election campaign of
a candidate for Federal office . . . which exceeds . . . the greater of (i) 2 cents
multiplied by the voting age population of the State . . .; or (ii) $20,000.”15
Originally, the FEC presumed that political parties were only capable of
making expenditures that were in coordination with their candidates; meaning
that all political party expenditures were subject to the limitations in the Party
Expenditure Provision.16 In Colorado I, the Supreme Court held that political
parties could make independent expenditures, that the expenditure in question
was an independent expenditure, and that under Buckley, it was an
unconstitutional limit on independent expenditures.17 Therefore, as applied to
this particular expenditure, the provision was unconstitutional. In Colorado I,
however, the Court avoided the Colorado Republican Party’s broader claim
that the entire Party Expenditure Provision was unconstitutional, including the
limits imposed on coordinated expenditures.18 The question again presented
itself before the Court in Colorado II. This time the Court faced the issue and
held that a party’s coordinated expenditures could be limited in light of the
substantial governmental interest in preventing corruption.19
In all of the campaign finance cases, the Court has wrestled with how to
properly weigh First Amendment freedoms against governmental interests.20

while the 1974 amendments to the FECA respected the role of political parties by separating them
from other political actors, the Act also provided the first statutory limits on party activity).
13. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d)(3)-(4) (1994).
14. See generally Colorado II, 121 S. Ct. 2351 (2001).
15. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d)(3)(A) (1994). The FEC took the position that a party may make
coordinated expenditures up to the above amount, in addition to the amount of direct
contributions permitted by generally applicable contribution limits. See Colorado II, 121 S. Ct. at
2366 n.16.
16. See David J. Lekich, Note, Still Blinking at Political Reality in Federal Elections:
Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Election Commission, 75 N.C. L.
REV. 1848, 1873 (1997).
17. Colorado I, 518 U.S. 604, 604 (1996).
18. Id. Instead, the Court remanded the case to the District Court of Colorado to further
examine this issue. For a discussion of the District Court’s holding, see infra note 72 and
accompanying text.
19. See Colorado II, 121 S. Ct. 2351, 2351 (2001).
20. See Jeremy Marsh, Note, Missouri’s Sacrificial Lamb: Political Party Contributions and
Campaign Finance Reform in Missouri Republican Party v. Lamb, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 925, 933
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The Court has held that the only government interest sufficient to uphold
provisions of the FECA is the interest in preventing corruption or the
appearance of corruption because the FECA’s contribution and expenditure
limitations “operate in the area of the most fundamental First Amendment
activities.”21 Political expression, including the rights of freedom of speech
and the freedom of associating with others of similar political beliefs, is at the
core of the First Amendment.22 In deciding which provisions to uphold, the
Court applies a standard known as exacting scrutiny, in which it asks, “whether
the restriction is ‘closely drawn’ to match what we have recognized as the
‘sufficiently important’ government interest in combating political
corruption.”23 In Colorado II, the party argued first that it should be subject to
a higher standard of scrutiny before its speech could be limited, and, in the
alternative, that there was not enough evidence of corruption to uphold the
limits on its coordinated expenditures.24
This Note examines the Court’s opinion in Colorado II and addresses
issues relating to political parties that the Court, particularly the majority, did
not sufficiently consider in making its ruling. Part I of this Note looks at the
background leading up to Colorado II, beginning with a discussion of Buckley
and followed by an examination of the Court’s decision in Colorado I. Part II
analyzes the Court’s decision in Colorado II, including both the majority and
dissenting opinions. Part III argues that the Court’s reasoning in Colorado II
left much to be desired because it failed to give sufficient consideration to the
following issues: (1) the tension it was creating between the decision in
Buckley and the decision in Colorado II; and (2) the importance of political
parties in American society, including the status given to them in the
Constitution as well as their role in furthering the structure of democracy.
Finally, Part IV discusses the most recent changes regarding campaign finance
reform legislation, specifically examining how new laws might affect political
parties.

(2001). Marsh noted that the First Amendment is the biggest obstacle to campaign finance
reform in America, and that the guarantee of free political speech would appear to be “an
insurmountable obstacle to creating effective limits on campaign spending.” Id.
21. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (noting that the government’s interest in
leveling the playing field for all candidates and trying to counter skyrocketing costs of campaigns
were not sufficient reasons to limit political expression).
22. Id. at 14-15 (noting that “[t]he First Amendment affords the broadest protection to such
political expression in order to assure the unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of
political and social changes desired by the people,” and “the First and Fourteenth Amendments
guarantee freedom to associate with others for the common advancement of political beliefs and
ideas.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
23. Colorado II, 121 S. Ct. at 2366 (citation omitted).
24. Id. at 2360, 2366.
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II. RELEVANT SUPREME COURT CAMPAIGN FINANCE DECISIONS: BUCKLEY
AND COLORADO I
A.

Buckley v. Valeo

Buckley v. Valeo25 was the Supreme Court’s first opportunity to rule on the
constitutionality of the FECA,26 and it provides the general context for
determining the constitutionality of campaign finance reform laws. In a per
curiam opinion27 spanning approximately 150 pages, the Court upheld
contribution limits, but found limitations on campaign expenditures,
independent expenditures, and a candidate’s expenditures from his personal
funds unconstitutional.28
The question the Court sought to answer in Buckley was not whether
Congress had the power to legislate in the area of federal elections, but
whether the “specific legislation that Congress has enacted interferes with First
Amendment freedoms.”29 The Court recognized that the limitations that the
Act placed on expenditures and contributions operated in the area of
fundamental First Amendment activities of freedom of speech and the right of
association.30
In addressing limits the FECA placed on contributions, the Court stated
that “a limitation upon the amount that any one person or group may contribute
to a candidate or political committee entails only a marginal restriction upon
the contributor’s ability to engage in free communication.”31 This is because a
contribution is merely symbolic; it serves only as a general expression of
support and communicates no underlying basis for that support.32

25. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 1.
26. In Buckley, the Court actually considered a challenge to several portions of the FECA as
well as to portions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. This Note is only concerned with the
challenges regarding contribution and expenditure limitations.
27. Only Justices Powell, Brennan, and Stewart joined all parts of the Court’s per curiam
opinion. Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Marshall, Rehnquist and Blackmun each joined
the opinion in part and dissented in part, and each filed his own opinion.
28. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 1 (1976). The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia had upheld the constitutionality of both the Act’s expenditure and contribution
provisions.
29. Id. at 14.
30. See id. at 14-15 (noting that freedom of political expression is “integral to the operation
of the system of government established by our constitution”).
31. Id. at 20.
32. See id. at 21. The Court further noted that:
A limitation on the amount of money that a person may give to a candidate or campaign
organization thus involves little direct restraint on his political communication, for it
permits the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a contribution but does not in
any way infringe the contributor’s freedom to discuss candidates and issues.
Id.
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While the Court considered four provisions that limited contributions, the
most significant was one which placed a $1000 ceiling on contributions by
individuals and groups (not including political parties) to candidates and
authorized campaign committees.33 The Court held that preventing corruption,
the primary purpose for the Act, was sufficient to find all of the contribution
limits constitutional.34 The Court stated that contributions not only carry a
danger of actual corruption, but also a potential for the appearance of
corruption.35 The $1000 ceiling dealt directly with the problem of large
contributions, an area associated with actual and potential corruption, while
still allowing people to engage in “independent political expression.”36
In discussing the expenditure limitations in the FECA, the Court found that
they represented a substantial restraint on the quantity and diversity of political
speech.37 In its opinion, the Court considered three types of expenditures that
the FECA sought to limit: (1) expenditures “relative to a clearly identified
candidate,”38 also called independent expenditures; (2) a candidate’s
expenditures from personal or family resources;39 and (3) overall campaign
expenditures.40
33. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 23 (1976).
34. See id. at 26-27. The Court noted that:
To the extent that large contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo from
current and potential office holders, the integrity of our system of representative
democracy is undermined. Although the scope of such pernicious practices can never be
reliably ascertained, the deeply disturbing examples surfacing after the 1972 election
demonstrate that the problem is not an illusory one.
Id.
35. See id. at 27. The appearance of corruption stems from the “public awareness of the
opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual financial contributions.” Id.
36. Id. at 28.
37. See id. at 19 (“A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on
political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by
restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of the exploration, and the size of the
audience reached.”).
38. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39 (1976). FECA placed a $1000 ceiling on the amount a
person could expend relative to a clearly identified candidate. See 18 U.S.C. § 608(e)(1) (1994).
Although these expenditures were made “relative to a clearly identified candidate,” they were
considered “independent” because of the absence of prearrangement or coordination of the
expenditure with the candidate or his agent. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47. As the Court noted, this
section “limits expenditures for express advocacy of candidates made totally independently of the
candidate and his campaign.” Id.
39. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 51. Section 608(a)(1) placed limits on the amount a candidate
could spend from his personal funds or the personal funds of his immediate family in connection
with his campaign. 18 U.S.C. § 608(a)(1). The amount varied depending on what office the
candidate sought. Id.
40. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 54. Section 608(c) placed limitations on overall campaign
expenditures by candidates seeking nomination for election and election to federal office. 18
U.S.C. § 608(c).
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Ultimately, the Court held the limits placed on all three types of
expenditures unconstitutional. The Court determined that the constitutionality
of each of the provisions turned on whether the governmental interest
advanced in their support could satisfy the exacting scrutiny applicable to
limitations on core First Amendment rights of political expression.41
With regard to the ceiling placed on independent expenditures, the Court
found that it failed “to serve any substantial governmental interest in stemming
the reality or appearance of corruption in the electoral process”42 and that it
“heavily burden[ed] core First Amendment protection.”43 Furthermore, the
Court noted that the governmental interest in “equalizing the relative ability of
individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections” was not
sufficient to justify the independent expenditure limits.44
The Court made a similar determination with respect to the limitations
placed on the expenditures by candidates from personal or family resources
and those placed on the overall campaign expenditures by candidates seeking
nomination for election and election to federal office. It again found that these
limitations did not further the governmental interest of preventing corruption
or the appearance of corruption. In fact, the Court noted that when a candidate
uses personal funds it “reduces the candidate’s dependence on outside
contributions and thereby counteracts the coercive pressures and attendant
risks of abuse to which the Act’s contribution limitations are directed.”45
Furthermore, the limits on overall expenditures were not necessary because the
problem associated with large expenditures is the danger of dependence on
large contributions, a problem addressed in the Act’s contribution limitations
and disclosure provisions.46
41. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44-45. For an explanation of exacting scrutiny, see supra note
23 and accompanying text.
42. Id. at 47-48. The Court made two points in reaching this conclusion. First, it argued that
even if large independent expenditures posed the same dangers of actual or apparent quid pro quo
arrangements as large contributions, 18 U.S.C. § 608(e)(1) did nothing to eliminate those dangers.
Id. at 45. Second, the Court noted that the limitations in § 608(e)(1) did not aid in preventing
attempts to circumvent the Act. Id. at 46-47.
43. Id. at 48.
44. Id. at 48-49.
[T]he concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in
order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment,
which was designed to secure the widest possible dissemination of information from
diverse and antagonistic sources, and to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.
Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
45. Id. at 53. The Court of Appeals had also noted that “the core problem of avoiding
undisclosed and undue influence on candidates from outside interests has lesser application when
the monies involved come from the candidate himself or from his immediate family.” Buckley v.
Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 855 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
46. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 55.
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Although the Court invalidated the provisions of the FECA that dealt with
independent expenditures, it “let stand FECA’s regulation of spending ‘in
connection with’ an election campaign, otherwise known as a coordinated
expenditure.”47 This category of campaign spending, which applies only to
political parties, eventually forced the Supreme Court to examine campaign
spending in the “political party context.”48
B.

Colorado I: The As-Applied Challenge

Buckley established the general precedent that the Constitution permits
individual contribution limits but it prohibits independent expenditure limits.
Colorado I, however, provided the Supreme Court with its first chance to
examine the limitations in the context of political parties.49 Furthermore,
Colorado I supplied the foundation for Colorado II as the two cases arose out
of the same facts.
In 1986, the Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee bought
radio advertisements attacking Timothy Wirth, the Democratic Party’s likely
When the ads were purchased, the Colorado
senatorial candidate.50
Republican Party had not yet chosen its senatorial candidate.51 The FEC
claimed that the party’s “expenditure” exceeded the dollar limits that a
provision of the FECA imposed on political parties.52 The party argued that
the expenditure limitations were unconstitutional as applied to the specific
expenditures at issue, and also attacked the constitutionality of the entire Party
Expenditure Provision.53
Ultimately, the Supreme Court decided that the expenditure in question in
Colorado I was an independent expenditure, which according to Buckley,
could not be restricted in light of the First Amendment.54 Although seven

47. Marsh, supra note 20, at 939. FECA treats coordinated expenditures as contributions.
For further discussion, see supra note 8 and accompanying text.
48. See id.
49. See Colorado I, 518 U.S. 604, 628 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and
dissenting in part) (“We had no occasion in Buckley to consider the possible First Amendment
objections to limitations on spending by parties.”).
50. See id. at 608. Wirth announced in January that he would seek the open Senate seat in
November, but the ads were bought in April, before the Democratic primary. Id. at 612.
51. Id. at 608.
52. Id. The provision limited the amount of money a party could spend “ ‘in connection
with’ a ‘general election campaign’ for congressional office.” See id. (quoting 2 U.S.C. §
441a(d)(3)). The FEC’s charge came after the State Democratic Party complained. Id. at 612. It
claimed the Colorado Party was left without a spending balance after it allotted it $103,000
general election allotment to the National Republican Senatorial Committee. Id.
53. Id. at 612.
54. Colorado I, 518 U.S. at 614. The Court’s reasoning was as follows:
Beginning with Buckley, the Court’s cases have found a fundamental constitutional
difference between money spent to advertise one’s views independently of the candidate’s
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justices agreed with the judgment, the Court was divided, and three basic
positions emerged: First, the three justices that joined in the plurality opinion,
Justices Breyer, Souter and O’Connor, did not want to reach the party’s broad
claim that the Party Expenditure Provision was unconstitutional on its face.
The plurality opinion focused only on the as-applied challenge to the Party
Expenditure Provision. The opinion addressed the fact that a political party’s
rights were at issue rather than those of an individual and noted that “[t]he
independent expression of a political party’s views is ‘core’ First Amendment
activity no less than is the independent expression of individuals, candidates,
or other political committees.”55 It further recognized that there were no
“special dangers of corruption associated with political parties that tip the
constitutional balance in a different direction,”56 and that the Government did
not point to any evidence that suggested a corruption problem with respect to
independent party expenditures.57 In deciding not to reach the party’s facial
challenge to the statute, the plurality opinion claimed that the lower courts’
opinions and the parties’ briefs did not “squarely isolate, and address, party
expenditures that in fact are coordinated.”58
Second, Justices Thomas, Kennedy and Scalia along with Chief Justice
Rehnquist concurred in the judgment, but all wanted to reach the Party’s
broader challenge.59 Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion that argued

campaign and money contributed to the candidate to be spent on his campaign. This
difference has been grounded in the observation that restrictions on the contributions
impose only a marginal restriction upon the contributor’s ability to engage in free
communication. . . . In contrast, the Court has said that restrictions on independent
expenditures significantly impair the ability of individuals and groups to engage in direct
political advocacy and represent substantial . . . restraints on the quantity and diversity of
political speech.
Id. at 614-15 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
55. Id. at 616.
56. Id. In further discussing the corruption issue, the Court stated that the danger involved is
that a donor could give a $20,000 donation to a party to be used for an independent expenditure in
support of a candidate, thus circumventing the $1000 limitation that an individual may contribute
to a candidate. Id. at 616-17. “We could understand how Congress, were it to conclude that the
potential for evasion of the individual contribution limits was a serious matter, might decide to
change the statute’s limitations on contributions to political parties.” Id. at 617.
57. Id. at 618. The opinion also suggested that Congress wrote the Party Expenditure
Provision “for the constitutionally insufficient purpose of reducing what it saw as wasteful and
excessive campaign spending,” rather than because of a special concern for corruption. Id.
58. Id. at 624.
59. Colorado I, 518 U.S. 604, 626 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and
dissenting in part). Justice Kennedy argued that the Party preserved its claim throughout the
lower court proceedings and that because of this, the Court should reach the issue and not remand
the case. See id. at 626. Justice Thomas noted that when the Party filed its counterclaim, all party
expenditures were treated as coordinated expenditures; therefore, a reference to expenditures,
meant both independent and coordinated and the lack of a specific reference to coordinated
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not only in favor of reaching the facial challenge, but also that the Party
Expenditure Provision was unconstitutional.60 He stated that under the statute,
it is “both burdensome and quite unrealistic for a political party to attempt the
expenditure of funds on a candidate’s behalf . . . without running afoul of
FECA’s spending limitations.”61 His opinion argued that contribution limits
upheld with respect to individuals and other associations did not apply to
political parties because:
It makes no sense . . . to ask, as FECA does, whether a party’s spending is
made “in cooperation, consultation, or concert with” its candidate. The answer
in most cases will be yes, but that provides more, not less, justification for
holding unconstitutional the statute’s attempt to control this type of party
spending, which bears little resemblance to the contributions discussed in
Buckley.62

Kennedy further noted that a party and its candidates are “inextricably
intertwined” because the party’s fate in an election is dependent on its
candidate; therefore, the speech of a party cannot be separated from the speech
of the candidate, and the party’s spending in cooperation with the candidate “is
indistinguishable in substance from expenditures by the candidate or his
campaign committee.”63
Justice Thomas also filed an opinion, in which he made two arguments: (1)
overrule Buckley; and (2) the corruption rationale does not apply when political
parties are the subjects of regulation.64 Thomas based his argument in favor of
overruling Buckley on two points: first, the contribution/expenditure distinction
articulated in Buckley “lacked constitutional significance,”65 and second,
expenditures did not prevent the Court from reaching the issue. See id. at 632 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
60. Id. at 626 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part). Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Scalia joined this opinion.
61. Id. at 627.
62. Id. at 629. Justice Kennedy continued, saying that a party spending in coordination with
a candidate communicates the underlying basis for a party’s support, that the candidate will be
elected to office and further the party’s political agenda. Id. at 629-30.
63. Id. at 630. Because Buckley held that a candidate cannot be restricted in the amount he
spends on his campaign, it follows that a party, whose speech and spending cannot be separated
from that of its candidate, can also not be limited. See id.; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
54-59 (1976).
64. Colorado I, 518 U.S. 604, 631 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and
dissenting in part).
65. Id. at 636. Thomas argued that “[c]ontributions and expenditures both involve First
Amendment expression because they further the discussion of public issues and debate on the
qualifications of candidates . . . integral to the operation of the system of government established
by our Constitution.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). He further noted that
“giving and spending in the electoral process also involve basic associational rights under the
First Amendment.” Id. at 637. He noted that the Court previously held that an interference with
the freedom of a party is also an interference with the freedom of the individuals associated with

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2002]

PARTY POOPERS

1011

because both contributions and expenditures operate in an area central to the
First Amendment, they should be subjected to strict scrutiny rather than
exacting scrutiny.66
Thomas also noted, however, that even without overruling Buckley, the
Party Expenditure Provision still violated the Constitution.67 He argued that
“the very aim of a political party is to influence its candidate’s stance on
issues, and, if the candidate takes office or is reelected, his votes.”68
Therefore, it is not really possible for a party to “corrupt” its candidates, and
thus no sufficient government interest exists to limit party expenditures.69
Finally, Justices Stevens and Ginsburg dissented claiming that all political
party spending in relation to the election of a candidate should be treated as a
contribution upon which limits should be placed.70
III. COLORADO II: THE FACIAL CHALLENGE
After the decision in Colorado I, the Supreme Court remanded the case to
the district court to consider the Party’s broader claim: all limits on political
party expenditures in connection with congressional campaigns are facially
unconstitutional even as to spending coordinated with a candidate.71
On remand, the District Court of Colorado held in favor of the Party and
stated that the limits on coordinated expenditures were unconstitutional.72 The
court found that the FEC failed to offer evidence demonstrating a compelling
need for limiting political parties’ coordinated expenditures.73 In holding for
the Party the court stated, “[b]ecause the FEC . . . failed to offer relevant,

that party. See id. (citing Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (plurality
opinion)). Limiting an individual’s rights to contribute as many resources as he wishes to the
pool also limits his ability to associate for effective advocacy. Colorado I, 518 U.S. at 637.
66. Id. at 640. Strict scrutiny requires a compelling governmental interest and legislative
means narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Id. at 641. For an explanation of exacting scrutiny,
see supra note 23 and accompanying text.
67. Id. at 644.
68. Id. at 646.
69. See Colorado I, 518 U.S. at 646 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting
in part) (“The structure of political parties is such that the theoretical danger of those groups
actually engaging in quid pro quos with candidates is significantly less that the threat of
individuals or others doing so.”).
70. Id. at 648 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens gave three reasons for limiting all political
party spending: (1) the limits avoid the appearance and the reality of a corrupt political process;
(2) there is an interest in blocking the attempts of individuals and certain organizations from
circumventing the FECA’s limits on them; and (3) the Government has an interest in leveling the
playing field, and constraining the costs of federal campaigns furthers this goal. Id. at 648-49.
71. Colorado II, 121 S. Ct. 2351, 2356 (2001).
72. See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 41 F. Supp. 2d
1197 (D.Colo. 1999).
73. See id. at 1213.
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admissible evidence which suggests that the coordinated party expenditures
must be limited to prevent corruption or the appearance thereof.”74
A three-judge panel in the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
decision, 2-1.75 The majority found that the FEC had not demonstrated that
political parties’ coordinated spending corrupts, or presents the appearance of
corrupting the electoral process.76 In addition, the Tenth Circuit recognized
that Buckley upheld limits on contributions, and that the FECA treated political
parties’ coordinated expenditures as contributions, but the court argued that
limitations on political parties created more that just a “marginal restriction on
upon the [parties’] ability to engage in free communication.”77
A.

The Parties’ Arguments to the Supreme Court

The FEC argued the case along Buckley lines, taking the precedent even
further. It claimed that the Party’s coordinated expenditures were the same as
party contributions, which under Buckley were subject to limits. The FEC also
argued that unlimited coordinated expenditures from a party to the candidate
“would induce individual and other nonparty contributors to give to the party
in order to finance coordinated spending for a favored candidate beyond the
contribution limits binding on them.”78
The Party, on the other hand, argued two points: (1) the coordinated
relationship between a party and its candidate so defines the party that it cannot
function without coordinated spending; and (2) a party is uniquely able to
spend in ways that promote candidate success.79 In response to the FEC’s
circumvention argument, the Party claimed that donations to parties are
relatively small, carrying little, if any, corrupting momentum with them, and
that if circumvention were a viable threat, the First Amendment demands a
response better tailored to that threat than a limitation on party spending.80

74. Id.
75. See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 213 F.3d 1221
(10th Cir. 2000).
76. See id. at 1232. “[Section] 441a(d)(3)’s limit on party spending is not closely drawn to
the recognized governmental interest but instead constitutes an unnecessary abridgment of First
Amendment freedoms.” Id. at 1233 (internal citations and quotations marks omitted).
77. Id. at 1232-33 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20 (1976)).
78. Colorado II, 121 S. Ct. 2351, 2361 (2001). The threat that the FEC perceived was one
of circumvention: “Individuals and nonparty groups who have reached the limit of direct
contributions to a candidate give to a party with the understanding that the contribution to the
party will produce increased party spending for the candidate’s benefit.” Id.
79. Id. at 2362.
80. Id. at 2369. The party even offered two suggestions: First, using the earmarking
provision of § 441a(d)(8), which provides that contributions that “are in any way earmarked or
otherwise directed through an intermediary or conduit to [a] candidate” are treated as
contributions to that candidate. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d)(8) (1994); Colorado II, 121 S. Ct. at 2369.
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The Majority Opinion

After Colorado I, the opinions of six of the nine justices were clear: four
would find restrictions on coordinated expenditures in the Party Expenditure
Provision unconstitutional, while two would uphold the limits. 81 Justices
Breyer, Souter and O’Connor became the swing votes and all three decided to
uphold the limits on coordinated expenditures, reversing the decisions reached
in the lower courts.82
Justice Souter wrote the majority opinion. Two issues needed answering.
The first, Souter framed as whether a political party is otherwise in a different
position from other political speakers, giving it a claim to demand a generally
higher standard of scrutiny before its coordinated spending was limited?83 The
second was whether a serious threat of abuse existed when a party made
unlimited coordinated expenditures?84
1.

Exacting Scrutiny is Appropriate

To reach a conclusion on the former issue, the majority addressed two
questions: (1) does limiting coordinated spending impose a unique burden on
parties; and (2) is there a reason to think that a party’s coordinated spending
raises the risk of corruption posed when others spend in coordination with a
candidate?85
The Court found that the limitations imposed on the parties did not cause
them to suffer a unique burden under the First Amendment and that a party’s
spending did pose a greater risk of corruption; it articulated three reasons for
ruling this way.86 First, the Court took the position that the parties and their
candidates are not so “joined at the hip” that most of its spending must be
coordinated.87 Second, the party does not only serve the role of electing
candidates, they also “act as agents for spending on behalf of those who seek to
produce obligated officeholders.”88 Because parties are able to raise large
Second, the party recommended replacing limits on a party’s coordinated expenditures with limits
on contributions to parties, which imposes a lesser First Amendment burden. Id. at 2370.
81. Justices Kennedy, Thomas and Scalia, along with Chief Justice Rehnquist, argued in
Colorado I for finding the limits unconstitutional, while Justices Stevens and Ginsburg found
constitutional all limits on political party spending.
82. See Colorado II, 121 S. Ct. 2351, 2351 (2001).
83. Id. at 2360.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 2362.
87. Colorado II, 121 S. Ct. 2351, 2363 (2001). The Court noted that thirty years of history
have proven otherwise, because coordinated spending by a party committee in a given race has,
ever since the Act was amended in 1974, been, in fact, limited by the provision being challenged.
Id. To argue that coordinated spending beyond the limits is essential to the functioning of the
party would be to say that political parties have not been functional for over three decades. Id.
88. Id. at 2364. The Court also stated:
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amounts of money and spend it intelligently, individuals and PACs may use
parties to undermine the contribution limits that apply to them.89 Finally,
parties are no different from other political spenders; individuals and PACs
with large amounts of money could coordinate with candidates just as parties
do, and under the FECA they would be subject to coordinated spending
limits.90
The above three points led the Court to the conclusion that the parties
should be subject to the same scrutiny applied to other political actors before
their coordinated expenditures are restricted. The Court applied exacting
scrutiny; the same standard applied in Buckley, and asked, “whether the
restriction is ‘closely drawn’ to match what [they] have recognized as the
‘sufficiently important’ government interest in combating political
corruption.”91
2.

There is a Substantial Threat of Abuse from Unlimited Coordinated
Party Spending

In deciding the second issue, the Court focused its attention on
circumvention of valid contribution limits and claimed that unlimited
coordinated party spending increases the risk of circumvention.92 The opinion

It is this party role, which functionally unites parties with other self-interested political
actors, that the Party Expenditure Provision targets. This party role, accordingly, provides
good reason to view limits on coordinated spending by parties through the same lens
applied to such spending by donors . . . that can use parties as conduits for contributions
meant to place candidates under obligation.
Id.
89. Id. at 2365. The Court asked:
If the coordinated spending of other, less efficient and perhaps less practiced political
actors can be limited consistently with the Constitution, why would the Constitution
forbid regulation aimed at a party whose very efficiency in channeling benefits to
candidates threatens to undermine the contribution (and hence coordinated spending)
limits to which those other actors are unquestionably subject?
Id.
90. See id. at 2365-66. The Court also said that the parties, although not in a unique position
from some individuals and PACs, do have an advantage because under the Party Expenditure
Provision, parties are allowed to spend more in coordination with a candidate than other actors.
See id. at 2366.
91. Id. at 2366 (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 387-388 (2000)).
92. See Colorado II, 121 S. Ct. at 2367. As the Court noted, the Act was in place for thirty
years; therefore, no recent experiences with unlimited coordinated spending existed for the Court
to consider. See id. Instead, the majority determined that because there was evidence under the
current laws that candidates, donors and parties test the limits, declaring parties’ coordinated
spending wide open would induce circumvention and further erode contribution limits. See id.
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stated, “if suddenly every dollar of spending could be coordinated with the
candidate, the inducement to circumvent would almost certainly intensify.”93
The Court also addressed the two alternatives that the Party suggested to
limiting its coordinated expenditures to prevent circumvention. In response to
the Party’s claim that the earmarking provision of § 441a(d)(8) would prevent
circumvention, the Court said that it would reach “only the most clumsy
attempts to pass contributions through to candidates.”94 In regards to the
Party’s second suggestion, that Congress limit contributions to parties, the
Court replied that “the choice is between limiting contributions and limiting
expenditures whose special value as expenditures is also the source of their
power to corrupt”95 and Congress is entitled to choose which to limit.96
The majority thus upheld restrictions on a party’s coordinated spending to
minimize circumvention of contribution limits constitutional.97
C. The Dissent
As in Colorado I, Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion in Colorado II,
and Justices Kennedy and Scalia joined him.98 Thomas cited three reasons for
rejecting the majority’s conclusion: (1) the Party Expenditure Provision swept
too broadly; (2) it interfered with the party-candidate relationship; and (3) no
proof existed that it was necessary to combat corruption.99

93. Id. at 2368. The Court offered an example to illustrate the possibility of circumvention.
It said that if a candidate could arrange for a party committee to foot his bills, to be paid with
$20,000 contributions to the party by his supporters, the number of donors necessary to raise
$1,000,000 could be reduced from 500 to 46. Id. at 2368. This, of course, would be too obvious,
but the example illustrated the “undeniable inducement to more subtle circumvention.” Id. at
2368 n.23.
94. Id. at 2370.
95. Id. at 2371. The opinion discussed the difference between the Court’s decision in
Colorado I and its decision here, noting that in the former instance, the expenditures were not
“potential alter egos for contributions,” but were independent expenditures, which under Buckley
deserved “the most demanding First Amendment scrutiny.” Id. at 2370. According to the Court,
the expenditure at issue in Colorado II was the functional equivalent of a direct contribution to a
candidate, and unlimited coordinated party spending would lead to increased contributions to
parties to finance direct spending on a candidate. See id. at 2371.
96. Id.
97. Colorado II, 121 S. Ct. 2351, 2371 (2001).
98. Chief Justice Rehnquist joined Part II of the dissent.
99. See Colorado II, 121 S. Ct. at 2371 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Citing to his opinion in
Colorado I, Justice Thomas again noted that he would overrule Buckley and apply strict scrutiny.
See id. Under that standard, he argued, this provision could not survive. See id. at 2372. He
continued, stating, “I remain baffled that this Court has extended the most generous First
Amendment safeguards to filing lawsuits, wearing profane jackets, and exhibiting drive-in
movies with nudity, but has offered only tepid protection to the core speech and associational
rights that our Founders sought to defend.” Id.
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The Provision is Too Broad and Disrupts the Party-Candidate
Relationship

In addressing the first two points listed above, Thomas argued that the
majority reached two flawed conclusions: first, that coordinated expenditures
by political parties are no different from contributions, and, second, that
political parties are no different from other political actors, for example, PACs
and individuals. With regards to the majority’s first “flaw,” the dissent
suggested that some party expenditures that the majority would consider
“coordinated” actually resemble independent expenditures, and should be
entitled to the same protections.100 These “coordinated expenditures,” argued
Thomas, constitute more than a “‘general expression of support for the
candidate and his views,’ [but served] as a communication of ‘the underlying
basis for the support.’”101
Justice Thomas adopted the words from Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in
Colorado I to discuss the second flawed conclusion the majority reached.102
He argued that the Buckley distinction between contributions and expenditures
cannot apply when the source of the funds is a political party.103 According to
Thomas, because the successes and failures of a party are directly related to
getting its candidates elected, it is only natural for a party to work with and to
coordinate its efforts with its candidates.104 Furthermore, the opinion
suggested that forcing a party to maintain independence from its candidate to
ensure that all spending is not coordinated and, therefore, restricted, creates
various problems for a party.105

Yet, Thomas focused his dissent on the fact that, even if the Court felt bound to follow
Buckley’s exacting scrutiny, the Party Expenditure Provision was unconstitutional. See id. at
2371. “Even under Buckley, which described the requisite scrutiny as ‘exacting’ and ‘rigorous,’
the regulation cannot pass constitutional muster.” Id. at 2372 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 16 (1976)).
100. Id. The dissent offered an example of this: a party develops an ad campaign for
television touting a candidate’s record on education, and the party simply “consult[s]” with the
candidate regarding the time slot. Id. at 2373. While the statute would consider this coordinated,
Thomas saw “no constitutional difference between this expenditure and a purely independent
one.” Id.
101. Id. at 2373 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976)).
102. See id. (“Political parties and their candidates are ‘inextricably intertwined’ in the
conduct of an election.”) (quoting Colorado I , 518 U.S. 604, 630 (1996) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part)).
103. See id. (“Restricting contributions by individuals and political committees may, under
Buckley, entail only a ‘marginal restriction,’ . . . but the same cannot be said about limitations on
political parties.”) (citation omitted).
104. See Colorado II, 121 S. Ct. 2351, 2373 (2001) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
105. See id. at 2374. Thomas further acknowledged that to maintain some independence a
national party would have to establish separate entities that made independent expenditures. Id.
at 2374. This independence could create voter confusion and might undermine the candidate that
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The Party Expenditure Provision Does Not Prevent Corruption

Justice Thomas’ other reason for dissenting rested on his belief that the
government failed to present sufficient evidence to demonstrate that a party’s
coordinated expenditures lead to corruption or that the restriction is closely
drawn to prevent this corruption.106 He argued that even if the government had
concrete evidence of corruption through circumvention, “better tailored
alternatives” existed to address that type of corruption.107 Thomas agreed with
the Party’s two suggestions, noting that either enforcement of the earmarking
provision in § 441a(d)(8) or, in the alternative, lowering the cap on
contributions to political parties while allowing the party to spend without
restriction, would be an appropriate remedy.108 Thomas concluded that “it
makes no sense to contravene a political party’s core First Amendment rights
because of what a third party might unlawfully try to do. Instead of broadly
restricting political parties’ speech, the Government should have pursued
better-tailored alternatives for combating the alleged corruption.”109
IV. ANALYSIS
In his dissent, Justice Thomas argued that the majority reached flawed
conclusions in its decision to uphold the limits on political parties’ coordinated
expenditures. The real problem in Colorado II was not the majority’s
conclusions, but rather the reasoning behind those conclusions. Colorado II
left much to be desired in part because the majority did not give sufficient
consideration to two important points. First, the majority’s decision in
Colorado II deviated from the reasoning set out in Buckley, resulting in a
tension between the two opinions as well as significant inconsistencies.
Second, the Court attached no importance to the unique role that political
parties play in American society, and avoided an examination of both the
integral part they play in the structure of democracy and the status they are
granted under the Constitution.

the party sought to support. See id. These extra burdens illustrate that limitations on a party’s
coordinated expenditures restrict the party’s ability to perform its primary function. See id.
106. Id. at 2376. The dissent did recognize that preventing corruption is a sufficient interest,
but noted that Congress’ intent in writing the Party Expenditure Provision was not to prevent
corruption, but rather “for the constitutionally insufficient purpose of reducing what it saw as
wasteful and excessive campaign spending.” Id. at 2376-77.
107. Id. at 2379-80.
108. Id. at 2380. For an explanation of the earmarking provision, see supra note 80 and
accompanying text. Thomas argued that these two alternatives direct the speech restriction at the
source of the alleged corruption. Id. at 2380. He said that “‘[t]he normal method of deterring
unlawful conduct is to impose an appropriate punishment on the person who engages in it.’” Id.
(quoting Bartnicki v. Vopper, 121 S. Ct. 1753, 1762 (2001)).
109. Colorado II, 121 S. Ct. at 2380.
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Tension Between Buckley and Colorado II

When comparing Buckley and Colorado II, two basic points of tension
become obvious. First, Buckley held that the Constitution did not permit the
FEC to limit the amount of money a candidate spent out of his own personal or
family accounts.110 Yet, in Colorado II, the majority upheld the limitations on
a party’s spending in coordination with its candidate because it found there
was a sufficient threat of corruption, and that the restrictions on a political
party’s coordinated expenditures in no way frustrated the First Amendment
rights of political parties.111 In making this finding, the Court failed to
recognize the unique relationship that exists between the party and its
candidates: a relationship that results in the two being “virtual alter egos.”112
Second, Buckley held that there must be a substantial governmental interest
in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption to justify limiting the
First Amendment rights of speech and association—the two core First
Amendment freedoms at issue in both Buckley and Colorado II. The majority
in Colorado II, however, found the restrictions constitutional despite the fact
that the government presented no evidence that the Party Expenditure
Provision prevented either actual or potential corruption.
1.

The Party is Not a Mere Contributor

The Court’s decision in Colorado II results in political parties being treated
like any other contributor, such as PACs and individuals. The party, however,
has a very different relationship with candidates than do other contributors, and
because of this, a party’s spending on a candidate’s election could be equated
to a candidate spending his personal funds, a possibility the majority in
Colorado II never considered.
In the context of an election, the party and its candidates are “inextricably
intertwined.”113 This argument was made in an opinion from the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals, in a case decided in between the Supreme Court’s
rulings in Colorado I and Colorado II.114 In Missouri Republican Party v.
Lamb, the Eighth Circuit held that a Missouri statute limiting the amount of
cash and in-kind contributions that political parties may give to a candidate for
public office violated the First Amendment.115 In writing for the court, Judge
Morris Shepherd Arnold argued that distinguishing the party from its candidate
110. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 53 (1976).
111. See Colorado II, 121 S. Ct. at 2351.
112. Mo. Republican Party v. Lamb, 227 F.3d 1070, 1072 (8th Cir. 2000).
113. Colorado I, 518 U.S. 604, 630 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and
dissenting in part) (“The party’s form of organization and the fact that its fate in an election is
inextricably intertwined with that of its candidates cannot provide a basis for the restrictions
imposed here.”). See Colorado II, 121 S. Ct. at 2373 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
114. See Lamb, 227 F.3d at 1070.
115. See id. at 1071.
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is, at the least, a difficult task.116 He noted that the principal way that parties
express themselves is through the speech of their candidates, and that, at times,
the parties and their candidates are “virtual alter egos.”117 Furthermore, the
opinion argued that the main object of a political party is to get its candidates
elected to office, so the speech of its candidates is also its own speech.118
The reason that a political party focuses so much attention on electing
candidates is that parties exist to develop and promote a platform; a party has
an agenda and goals that it seeks to further. It does this by nominating
candidates who, throughout the election, will be identified with that party.119
The positions of the party are the essence of that party, and it seeks to elect
candidates that adhere to a core set of beliefs that furthers the party’s
position.120 The success or failure of a party is directly related to the election
of its candidates; if a candidate wins, his party also wins.121 Therefore, the
close ties that exist between a political party and its candidates require that
they be able to coordinate; coordination is not just one of many freely available
options for party expression, it is really the only way a candidate and party can
work towards achieving their common goals.122
The real problem is that the Court treated the party as another contributor,
putting it on the same level as an individual or PAC. In reality, however, the
parties are really separate actors similar to the candidates themselves. Parties
are not in place merely to contribute money to a candidate’s campaign, they
exist to further their own political agendas, and to do that, they nominate
candidates and assist those candidates in getting elected.123 In light of the fact
116. See id. Arnold went even further with this argument, saying that often the party and its
candidate are virtually indistinguishable from each other, and their identities are merged in a way
that makes dealings between them more than merely transient symbiotic ones between separate
and distinct entities. Id. at 1072.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See Colorado I, 518 U.S. 604, 629 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and
dissenting in part). Justice Kennedy recognized that a party has traditions and principles that may
transcend the interests of individual candidates, but in the context of an election, candidates are
absolutely necessary in getting the party’s message out, and parties are necessary to get the
candidate’s message known. Id.
120. See Peter J. Wallison, It’s Not Corruption, It’s Politics, WASH. POST, June 3, 2001, at
B1.
121. See Colorado II, 121 S. Ct. 2351, 2373 (2001) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
122. See Respondent’s Brief at 25, Colorado II, 121 S. Ct. 2351 (2001) (No. 00-191). The
Respondents in Colorado II further argued that, “[f]or a political party, entering in a working
relationship with a candidate is not just one of a range of equally available options. To the
contrary, party candidates exist because parties nominate them, and from the moment a party
makes a nomination, a natural, strong, and unique tie is established.” Id. at 26.
123. See Nahra, supra note 12, at 102 (noting that the party can only fulfill its goals and
express its opinions through its candidates). See also Marsh, supra note 20, at 954 (noting that
“the object of the party is to elect its candidates for office”).
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that parties are separate actors, not mere contributors, a strong argument exists
for treating parties the same as candidates, with the restrictions placed on the
amount of money that can be contributed to the party, not on the amount that
the party can spend.
The justification for not allowing limits on the amount that a candidate can
spend from his own personal funds is that there is no substantial threat of
corruption. The same holds true in the case of political parties spending in
coordination with their candidates. Just as with a candidate, the use of party
funds “reduces the candidate’s dependence on outside contributions and
thereby counteracts the coercive pressures and attendant risks of abuse to
which the Act’s contribution limits are directed.”124
2.

The Threat of Corruption is Not Substantial

In Buckley, the Court held that the only justification for limiting core First
Amendment protections is a substantial threat of corruption.125 Yet, in
Colorado II, the Court upheld the restrictions on political parties with little
evidence of corruption; in fact, the Court relied on pure speculation in reaching
its conclusion.
Not only has the Court recognized the threat of corruption as the only
legitimate reason for upholding limits on contributions, it defines this
corruption as an explicit quid pro quo arrangement.126 As discussed above, a
valid threat of a party corrupting its candidates does not exist. Parties and
candidates work together for a common goal; the party does not need to exert
influence over its candidates. Parties choose candidates who, at least to some
extent, have shown agreement with that party’s views.127 This, however, is not
the kind of corruption that the Court spoke of in Colorado II. Instead, it saw a
substantial threat of circumvention of other contribution limits warranting
limits on the Party’s coordinated expenditures. The situation that the Court
contemplated in Colorado II was as follows: an individual makes the
maximum direct contribution to a specific candidate that is allowed under the
124. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 53 (1976). See Nahra, supra note 12, at 102. In his
opinion in Colorado I, Justice Thomas also noted that if a party spends large amounts of money
on the election of one of its candidates, that candidate wins, takes office and implements the
parties’ platform that is not corruption; rather that is “successful advocacy of ideas in the political
marketplace and representative government in a party system.” 518 U.S. at 646 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
125. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26. The Court also reaffirmed this position in Federal Election
Commission v. National Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. 480 (1985) [hereinafter NCPAC]. See also
Nahra, supra note 12, at 102. Nahra noted that in NCPAC the Supreme Court reemphasized that
preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption was the only legitimate rationale for
limiting the exercise of fundamental First Amendment rights in the context of a campaign. Id.
(citing NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 500-501).
126. See Nahra, supra note 12, at 102 (citing NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 497).
127. See id. at 105.
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Act and then, still wanting to give more to that candidate, the individual
contributes money to that candidate’s political party, with the understanding
that the money is to go towards that candidates’ election.128
Although one can see how circumvention of other contribution limits
might occur, the fact remains that the Court had little, if any, proof that it
would occur. In arguing that a substantial threat of corruption did exist, the
Court could only point to a system the Democratic Party used, commonly
known as tallying.129 Tallying is basically an informal agreement that if a
candidate helps the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC) raise
funds the DSCC will, in turn, help the candidates’ campaign.130 The majority
found that this process of tallying was “a sign that contribution limits are being
diluted and could be diluted further if the floodgates were open.”131 Yet, given
the relationship between the party and its candidates and the fact that in an
election the two are working not just for themselves but also for each other, it
hardly seems unreasonable that a party would make an agreement that if a
candidate helps it, it will help the candidate. The Court also suggested that
because a candidate could expect his donation from the DSCC to be related to
how much he raised for the DSCC that this would lead to corruption.
The problem with the Court’s rationale is that there was no proof that the
candidates knew who donated the money to the DSCC and how much each
individual gave. As previously noted, the corruption that the Court has
recognized as sufficient to uphold the contribution limits is a quid pro quo
arrangement, which does not present a problem when a party gives money to
its candidate. Similarly, a party giving the money it raised from individuals to
a candidate raises no threat of a quid pro quo arrangement unless the candidate
knows who contributed the money to that party. The fact that a candidate
receives an amount from the party in proportion to what he raises for the party
does not by itself lead to corruption.
Furthermore, even if circumvention is a substantial threat, the Court should
have given more consideration to the alternatives available to limiting the
speech of political parties, organizations that, by their own right, do not pose a
threat of corruption. As the dissent and the Party noted, two alternatives exist.
The first involves a provision in the FECA itself, known as the earmarking
provision. This provision makes it illegal for an individual to donate money to
a party for use on a specific candidate’s campaign.132 It appears that this
provision is a direct solution to the problem of circumvention. The majority,
128. See Colorado II, 121 S.Ct. 2351, 2367 (2001).
129. See id. at 2368.
130. See id. In its discussion on tallying, the majority relied on declarations by various
individuals in the Democratic Party.
131. Id. at 2368 n.22. The Court suggested that the obvious reason for tallying was that the
party wants to know who gets the benefit of the money raised by the party. Id.
132. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(8) (1994).
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however, dismissed it as a rule that “would reach only the most clumsy
attempts to pass contributions through to candidates.”133 As the dissent
pointed out, however, the Court provided no evidence that this rule did not
address the problem at hand. The other alternative available is to lower the
amount that an individual can contribute to a political party, rather than
limiting the amount that a party could spend in coordination with its
candidates. If a threat of corruption through circumvention does exist, aiming
the remedy directly at the culprits, individuals and PACs, is a more appropriate
and direct measure than denying a political party its First Amendment rights.
B.

The Role of Political Parties in the United States

Figuring out exactly what the role of political parties entails in American
society is a difficult task, and one that well exceeds the bounds of this Note.
No matter how their role is defined, however, one thing remains clear: political
parties are an important force in the politics of the United States. Therefore,
the distinction between contributions and expenditures first articulated in
Buckley, and ever-present in the Supreme Court’s campaign finance cases,
cannot withstand a challenge by a political party. In other words, the Court’s
ruling in Buckley, that limits for individuals and political committees were
constitutional because they imposed only a “marginal restriction” on the rights
of freedom of speech and association, did not contemplate contributions from
political parties. Yet, in Colorado II, the Court never considered that while the
above may hold true for mere contributors, limits on political party
contributions, or coordinated expenditures, might impose a greater burden.
The majority’s failure to consider this possibility reflects an even larger
oversight on its part: the Court did not attach any significance to either the
status of parties under the Constitution or the role that parties play in furthering
the goal of democracy set out in the Constitution.
1.

The Constitutional Status of Parties

It is no secret that the Framers of the Constitution feared parties, and that
parties are not mentioned in the Constitution.134 While there were many ideas
the Framers could not agree on, they did share “a common conviction about

133. Colorado II, 121 S. Ct. at 2370.
134. See Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., Political Parties and American Constitutionalism, in
AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS 1 (Peter W. Schramm &
Bradford P. Wilson eds., 1993). The author notes, however, that America is not unique for
leaving parties out of its constitution; most free countries do not mention parties in their
constitutions. Id. Yet, in the case of the United States Constitution, it is true that the original
version did not imagine that there would be political parties. One commentator even noted that
the Founders “feared and despised political parties.” James A. Gardner, Can Party Politics Be
Virtuous?, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 667, 667 (2000).
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the baneful effects of the spirit of the party.”135 In fact, in The Federalist No.
10, James Madison’s hostile opinions of permanent political parties are quite
evident.136 George Washington also warned against them in his Farewell
Address, and Alexander Hamilton said that the Constitution’s goal was “to
abolish factions, and to unite all parties for the general welfare.”137
Part of the problem that the Framers had with parties, however, was that
they viewed parties as the same thing as factions, when in fact the two are
different.138 One scholar noted that political parties today are “parties of
principle,” while factions are “parties of interest.”139 It was the latter that the
Framers really feared, but because they used the two terms interchangeably,
political parties were also suspect.140 While the Framers feared parties, or
factions, even Madison recognized that the causes of faction—differing
opinions, passions, and interests—could not be removed. Therefore, the idea
was to find a way to control the effects of faction, rather than prevent them
entirely.141
Despite this fear of political parties that the Framers expressed, political
parties soon became “a part of the machinery of government in a manner that
went well beyond Madison’s resigned acceptance of them as evils that would
always be there.”142 Ironically, the very people who warned of the evils of
political parties were at the forefront of the rise of the party, so that the
135. Petitioner’s Brief at 39, Colorado II, 121 S. Ct. 2351 (2001) (No. 00-191). See RICHARD
HOFSTADTER, THE IDEA OF A PARTY SYSTEM 2 (1969). Hofstadter commented further that the
Framers all seemed to agree that an effective constitution would be one that successfully
counteracted the work of parties. Id. at 53.
136. Mansfield, supra note 134, at 5. Madison argued in favor of a republic; he thought that
America should be governed by a majority faction, but instead of factions fixed in parties
organized for a long life, he anticipated temporary, shifting coalitions. See generally THE
FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
137. Gardner, supra note 134, at 667 (quoting Alexander Hamilton in 2 THE DEBATES IN THE
SEVERAL STATES: CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 320
(Jonathan Elliot, ed., Hein & Co. reprint ed. 1996)).
138. See DEAN MCSWEENEY & JOHN ZVESPER, AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES 7 (1991);
HOFSTADTER, supra note 135, at 64 (noting that Madison used the words party and factions as
synonyms).
139. MCSWEENEY & ZVESPER, supra note 138, at 7. Madison defined faction as: “[A]
number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and
actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other
citizens, or to he permanent and aggregate interests of the community.” Id. (quoting THE
FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison)). See also HOFSTADTER, supra note 135, at 65 n.26 (noting
that Edmund Burke defined “party” as based on principles at aiming to advance common
interests, while Madison defined both “party” and “faction” as passions and interest aimed at
threatening the general welfare).
140. MCSWEENEY & ZVESPER, supra note 138, at 7.
141. HOFSTADTER, supra note 135, at 66. Madison felt that plurality and variety would
prevent the emergence of a cohesive and oppressive majority. See id. at 67.
142. Id. at 70.
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formation of national political parties and the formation of the republic were
almost concurrent.143 Over the years, political parties have become the force
that drives the Constitution, enabling it to remain a working document.144
Although it is clear that the Framers did not intend to give constitutional
significance to the parties, Article III, as well as amendments to the original
document, suggests that parties do have constitutional status. While parties are
still not mentioned in the Constitution, the passage of the Twelfth and Twentyfifth Amendments suggests that the Constitution recognizes their
importance.145
The Twelfth Amendment, passed in 1804, states, in pertinent part, that:
The Electors shall meet in their respective states and vote by ballot for
President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant
of the same state with themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person
voted for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as VicePresident.146

This amendment provided for separate elector votes for President and VicePresident. Prior to its passage, Article II had governed the election, stating
that:
The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by Ballot for two
Persons . . . . The Person having the greatest Number of Votes shall be the
President . . . . [a]fter the Choice of the President, the Person having the
greatest Number of Votes of the Electors shall be the Vice-President.147

Under Article II, it was possible that the President and Vice-President would
not be from the same party, and this, in fact, happened in 1796 when John
Adams, a Federalist, became President, and Thomas Jefferson, a Democratic143. See Petitioner’s Brief at 41, Colorado II, 121 S. Ct. 2351 (2001) (No. 00-191) (quoting
Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 574 (2000)).
144. HOFSTADTER, supra note 135, at 70. Hofstadter quoted Lord Bryce:
The whole machinery, both of national and State governments, is worked by political
parties. . . . The spirit and force of party has in America been as essential to the action of
the machinery of government as steam is to a locomotive engine. . . . The actual working
of party government is not only one of full interest and instruction, but is so unlike what a
student of the Federal Constitution could have expected or foreseen, that it is the thing of
all others which anyone writing about America ought to try to portray.
Id. (quoting 1 JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 6 (3d ed. 1897); 2 id. at 3, 4)).
See Mansfield, supra note 134, at 4 (noting that we should not be surprised that while parties are
not mentioned in the Constitution, they are necessary to the working of the Constitution).
145. One scholar has argued that the Constitution cannot mention parties because:“The
American Constitution confines itself to formal statements of the powers and terms of its offices,
not prescribing how they are to be exercised. . . . If [parties] were mentioned in the
Constitution . . . [parties] would have had to be described formally . . . .” Mansfield, supra note
134, at 2.
146. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
147. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
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Republican, became the Vice-President.148 After this election, many became
convinced that an amendment was needed to require separate ballots for
President and Vice-President.149 This need became even more apparent after
the turbulent election of 1800, in which Jefferson, again a Presidential
candidate, and his running mate, Vice-Presidential candidate Aaron Burr,
received the same number of votes throwing the decision into the House of
Representatives.150
By providing for the separate election of the President and Vice-President,
the Twelfth Amendment acknowledged the role of partisanship in the electoral
process.151 No longer could the President and Vice-President come from
different parties; instead, electors would not only vote for candidates, but also
for parties. As Lloyd Cutler put it:
[T]he Constitution [, under the Twelfth Amendment,] requires voters to vote
for electors who normally cast their ballots for one party’s presidential and
vice-presidential candidates as a team. In 1984, it was not possible to vote for
Reagan and Ferraro, or for Mondale and Bush.152

Similarly, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment also gave constitutional status to
the parties. The Amendment, passed in 1967, addresses presidential
succession, presidential disability, and vice-presidential replacement.153

148. See William Josephson & Beverly J. Ross, Repairing the Electoral College, 22 J. LEGIS.
145, 154 (1996). In that election, John Adams, the Presidential candidate from the Federalist
party, received three more votes than Thomas Jefferson, the Democratic-Republican Presidential
candidate. However, a large number of Federalist electors did not cast their votes for the
Federalist’s Vice-Presidential candidate, Thomas Pinckney, so that Jefferson was elected Vice
President. Id.
149. See id. at 155.
150. See Victor Williams & Alison M. MacDonald, Rethinking Article II, Section 1 and Its
Twelfth Amendment Restatement: Challenging Our Nation’s Malapportioned, Undemocratic
Presidential Election Systems, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 201, 202-03 (1994). See also Josephson &
Ross, supra note 148, at 155 (“Because the Federalists had lost the vice presidency in 1796, the
Republican electors in 1800 were afraid or unwilling to chance a similar result.”).
151. See MCSWEENEY & ZVESPER, supra note 138, at 40. See also Charles R. Kesler,
Political Parties, The Constitution, and the Future of American Politics, in AMERICAN
POLITICAL PARTIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS 233 (1993) (noting that the “single
constitutional change needed to accommodate political parties was the Twelfth Amendment,
which in effect transferred from the electoral college to political parties many of the deliberative
functions integral to presidential selection”).
152. Lloyd N. Cutler, Party Government Under the American Constitution, 134 U. PA. L.
REV. 25, 39 n.70 (1985).
153. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV; George Anastoplo, Amendments to the Constitution of
the United States: A Commentary, 23 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 631, 828 (1992). See also John D.
Feerick, The Twenty-Fifth Amendment: An Explanation and Defense, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
481, 489 (1995). Feerick noted that the need for this amendment was realized after President
Dwight Eisenhower suffered a heart attack and Vice-President Richard Nixon attended to the
President’s affairs while he recovered. Id. Although this worked out well at the time, had the
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Prior to the passage of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, succession to the
presidency when the office of Vice-President was vacated was prescribed by
an act of Congress.154 This usually meant that the Speaker of the House was
country been in a serious international crisis, this system would not have worked. The TwentyFifth Amendment states the following:
Section 1. In case of the removal of the President from office or of his death or
resignation, the Vice President shall become President.
Section 2. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice President, the President
shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon confirmation by a majority
vote of both Houses of Congress.
Section 3. Whenever the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable
to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written
declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice
President as Acting President.
Section 4. Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of
the executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide,
transmit to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers
and duties of the office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability
exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of his office unless the Vice President and a
majority of either the principal officers of the executive department or of such other body
as Congress may by law provide, transmit within four days to the President pro tempore
of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration
that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. Thereupon
Congress shall decide the issue, assembling within forty-eight hours for that purpose if not
in session. If the Congress, within twenty-one days after receipt of the latter written
declaration, or, if Congress is not in session, within twenty-one days after Congress is
required to assemble, determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall continue
to discharge the same as Acting President; otherwise, the President shall resume the
powers and duties of his office.
U.S. CONST. amend. XXV.
154. See Anastaplo, supra note 153, at 828; See also U.S. CONST. art. II, §1, cl. 6. This
clause states:
In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or
Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the same shall devolve on
the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal,
Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what
Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the
Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.
Id.
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next in line, but this made it possible for the Presidency to shift from one
political party to another.155 The Twenty-Fifth Amendment, however,
provides a procedure for filling a vacancy in this situation, thus reducing the
possibility of resorting to the statutory line of succession.156
Yet, parties did not only obtain constitutional status through the passage of
amendments. The original document also elevated the status of the party
through a theory known as “partisan entrenchment.”157 In an article entitled
Understanding The Constitutional Revolution, Jack Balkin and Sanford
Levinson suggest that political parties help bring about constitutional
revolutions and changes in American constitutional law.158 The argument is
that over time, the Constitution changes because of Article III interpretation,
and the party, through presidential appointments to the judiciary, plays a role
in this change.159
When a party wins the White House, it can stock the federal judiciary with
members of its own party, assuming a relatively acquiescent Senate. . . .
[Federal judges] are temporally extended representatives of particular parties,
and hence, of popular understandings about public policy and the Constitution.
The temporal extension of partisan representation is what we mean by partisan
entrenchment.160

In other words, a political party is able to place its own members in the federal
judiciary, and when enough members of a particular party are appointed to the
federal judiciary, they start to change the understandings of the Constitution.161
“Parties who control the presidency install jurists of their liking. . . . Those
jurists in turn create decisions which are embodied in constitutional doctrine
and continue to have influence long after those who nominated and confirmed
the jurists have left office.”162 Therefore, parties attain a status under the
Constitution by way of their ability to affect the interpretations of it through
presidential appointments of Article III judges.
In sum, political parties, though not mentioned in the Constitution, do
obtain constitutional status by way of the Twelfth and Twenty-Fifth
Amendments, as well as through presidential appointments. Through these
provisions, the Constitution recognizes that parties are extensions of the
candidates. One cannot exist without the other. In Colorado II, however, the
Court failed to recognize the significance the Constitution attaches to the party.
155. See Anastoplo, supra note 153, at 828.
156. See Feerick, supra note 153, at 498.
157. See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution,
87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1066 (2001).
158. See id.
159. See id. at 1068.
160. Id. at 1067.
161. Id.
162. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 157, at 1076.
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The opinion did not acknowledge or even explore the possibility that parties
obtain a special status under the Constitution. The Court failed to see that in
upholding the limits on the amount a party could spend in coordination with its
candidates, it was preventing the party from performing its constitutional
functions.
2.

The Role of Parties in Furthering Democracy

Even if one remains skeptical about the notion that parties have a
significant constitutional status, it is hard to ignore their influence in furthering
the goals of the Constitution, namely in strengthening the ideal of democracy.
While scholars have difficulty agreeing on the precise functions of political
parties in a democratic society, they all seem to accept the thesis that parties
“are indispensable to the functioning of democratic political systems.”163
Preserving the Constitution and promoting its objectives is the touchstone of
American political parties; whatever their function—from recruiting and
nominating candidates, to encouraging voters to go to the polls—the parties
perform it in the name of guarding the Constitution.164
In their book, Political Parties in America, Frank Sorauf and Paul Allen
Beck claim that competitive political parties in every democracy perform at
least three functions: (1) they select candidates and contest elections; (2) they
propagandize on behalf of a party ideology or program; and (3) they attempt to
guide the elected officeholders of government to provide particular policy or
patronage benefits.165 Perhaps the most obvious role of parties is the
responsibility they assume in the electoral process and, thus, the campaign
process. The process by which political leaders are recruited, elected and
appointed to office form the central core of party activity.166 Since the parties
provide campaign services and funds to candidates, they are major players in

163. WILLIAM J. KEEFE, PARTIES, POLITICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY IN AMERICA 30 (7th ed.
1994). See CLINTON ROSSITER, PARTIES AND POLITICS IN AMERICA 60 (1960) (“Political parties
and democracy are inseparable phenomena”); Nancy L. Rosenblum, Political Parties as
Membership Groups, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 813, 814 (2000). (“Political parties are the voluntary
associations principally committed to making democracy.”); Geoffrey M. Wardle, Comment,
Time to Develop a Post-Buckley Approach to Regulating the Contributions and Expenditures of
Political Parties: Federal Election Commission v. Colorado Republican Campaign Committee,
46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 603, 626 (1996) (“Parties are central to American politics. . . . They are
essential elements to overcoming the disassociation Americans have with the political system.”).
164. See Kesler, supra note 151, at 230; Balkin & Levinson, supra note 157, at 1077-78
(“Political parties represent the people not only in their views about ordinary politics, but also in
their views about the deepest meanings of the Constitution and the country.”).
165. FRANK J. SORAUF & PAUL ALLEN BECK , PARTY POLITICS IN AMERICA 12 (6th ed.
1988).
166. KEEFE, supra note 163, at 32. See ROSSITER, supra note 163, at 40 (noting that the
parties establish and maintain the machinery that puts men and women in public office, and that
parties do this at four key points: nominations, campaigns, elections, and appointments).
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both the federal and state campaign processes.167 In fact, it has been argued
that, today, parties are the “single most important player in the federal
campaign process.” 168 They are no longer known merely for their role as a
distributor of the spoils of local government elections; instead, they have
become national organizations that focus on providing campaign services.169
One important campaign service they provide is educating the public; they
transmit political values and information to large numbers of current and future
voters.170 They help to educate the voters on issues, provide a linkage between
the people and the government, and simplify the choices that voters have to
make in elections.171
While political parties are a constant in the electoral process, they serve
other functions in society as well. For example, educating the public, though it
can be considered a campaign service, is also a social function that parties
serve.172 In addition, they act as buffers and adjusters between individuals and
society and provide an object to which citizens of the United States can extend
allegiance.173 Parties also serve as groups that people can identify with,
become active in, contribute to, work within, become officers of and
participate in setting agendas, goals and strategies.174
Beck and Sorauf also argue that there are four “indirect consequences” of
American party activity that benefit society.175 First, political parties
participate in the social unification of the American electorate; they symbolize
and represent a political point of view, offering uninformed or underinformed
citizens a map of the political world.176 Second, American parties contribute to
the accumulation of political power.177 They aggregate masses of political
individuals and groups, organizing blocks powerful enough to govern or to

167. See Marsh, supra note 20, at 963-64.
168. Nahra, supra note 12, at 88.
169. Id. See Marsh, supra note 20, at 963.
170. See SORAUF & BECK, supra note 165, at 15.
171. See KEEFE, supra note 163, at 33.
172. See ROSSITER, supra note 163, at 48. For example, Rossiter noted that the Republicans,
through President Abraham Lincoln, educated the nation in the true nature and implications of
slavery, while the Democratic party, through President Franklin Roosevelt, sought to educate us
on the proper relations of private enterprise and public authority. Id. at 48.
173. See id. at 49-50. In regards to the former role, Rossiter noted that “the parties are still
important dispensers of those aids, favors, and immunities . . . that make it possible for men and
women to live reasonably confident lives in a harsh environment.” Id. at 49. Keefe also
commented that parties serve as brokers among the organized interests of American society
because they help keep group conflicts within tolerable limits. KEEFE, supra note 163, at 34.
174. Rosenblum, supra note 163, at 817.
175. SORAUF & BECK , supra note 165, at 15-16.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 16.
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oppose those who govern.178 Third, they dominate the recruitment of political
leadership.179 Many individuals in public service entered into such service
through a political party, and because parties are present in all levels of the
federal government, they are able to recruit and elevate leadership from one
level to the next.180 Finally, parties are a force of unification in the divided
American political system.181 As one author noted, they bring people of diverse
political views together; by providing a structure to bring divergent social and
ideological groups together, parties limit the destructive impact of
factionalism.182
Because political parties and PACs provide similar services, it is important
to differentiate between the two to understand why political parties deserve to
be treated differently than PACs.
Beck and Sorauf identified five
characteristics of political parties that distinguish them from other political
organizations: (1) the extent to which they pursue their organizing through the
contesting of elections; (2) the extensiveness and inclusiveness of their
organizations and clientele; (3) their sole concentration on political avenues for
achieving their goals; (4) their demonstrated stability and long life; and (5)
their strength as cues and reference symbols in the decision making of
individual citizens.183 The authors also noted that none of these characteristics
alone sets the political parties apart from other political actors, but when taken
together, and when the matter of degree is considered, no other political
organization matches the political party.184
The purpose political parties aim to serve also sets them apart from PACs
and other political actors. PACs usually serve a narrow interest in society;
178. Id. See ROSSITER, supra note 163, at 46 (noting that the minority party is expected to
organize itself in the legislature for the primary purpose of checking the majority party).
179. SORAUF & BECK, supra note 165, at 16.
180. Id. (“One needs only to run down a list of the members of the cabinet or even the federal
courts to see how many of them entered public service through a political party or through
partisan candidacy for office.”).
181. Id. See Wardle, supra note 163, at 627 (noting that parties offer structure that facilitates
consensus and overcomes divisiveness).
182. See Wardle, supra note 163, at 627. Balkin and Levinson also noted that parties are
important institutions for translating and interpreting popular will and negotiating among various
interest groups and factions. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 157, at 1066.
183. SORAUF & BECK, supra note 165, at 19. Other authors have noted the uniqueness of
political parties. One article argued that only political parties are engaged in recruiting and
nominating candidates and educating the public about those candidates and issues for the
astonishing number and kind of elective offices at the local, state and federal levels in the United
States; no other group takes a similarly comprehensive view of the public interest and political
agenda. Rosenblum, supra note 166, at 815. The same article stated that only parties “routinely,
pervasively, and legitimately exercise influence from within government.” Id. In addition, the
right to be on the election ballot separates political parties from all other political associations.
Id. at 814-15.
184. See SORAUF & BECK, supra note 165, at 15.
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they have one purpose and want to further only one objective. Political parties,
on the other hand, serve multiple purposes, and are not “ideological or
narrowly bound to specific views.”185 Parties have to steer a middle course to
be able to win or retain office, where other political organizations often
advocate only one issue and take one side of that issue, not worrying about
appealing to the masses.186 Because parties are multi-interest groups they
stand in a unique position to originate policies and to find a way to broaden the
special concerns of others; and their policies are typically more realistic than
those that emerge from single-interest political groups.187
Developing an exact description of the functions of political parties and
their role in society is not necessary. The point is that they “provide a whole
bundle of valuable benefits,”188 and their part in fostering the democratic
society in America is extremely important.
Just as the Court failed to recognize the constitutional significance of
parties in Colorado II, it also neglected to take notice of the role of parties in
American society. To achieve the goal of promoting democracy, political
parties must elect candidates. In order to elect candidates, however, parties
have to be able to spend money. Buckley held that contributions, and thus
coordinated expenditures, could be limited because they entailed “only a
marginal restriction upon the contributor’s ability to engage in free
communication.”189 On the other hand, restrictions on expenditures were
unconstitutional because they represented “substantial rather than merely
theoretical restraints on the quantity and diversity of political speech.”190 If the
Court in Colorado II had considered the role of parties in society, it would
have realized that in the context of political parties, the distinction between
contributions and expenditures articulated in Buckley breaks down.191
A political party’s spending in coordination with its candidate is the party’s
only means of communication. Advocating for candidates and putting those
candidates in office is how parties speak; to do this they must be able to spend
money in coordination with those candidates they seek to elect. Judge Arnold
made this point in Lamb, in which he argued that it is difficult to say that a
political party’s contribution “does not communicate the underlying basis for
support.”192 He also noted that a party’s contributions are not merely

185. Lekich, supra note 16, at 1879.
186. See Marsh, supra note 20, at 967.
187. See ROSSITER, supra note 161, at 42.
188. Steven G. Calabresi, Political Parties as Mediating Institutions, 61 U. CHI. L. REV.
1479, 1530 (1994) (arguing that political parties are invaluable for the work they do in keeping
agency costs down and in providing some degree of accountability).
189. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20 (1976).
190. Id. at 19.
191. See Mo. Republican Party v. Lamb, 227 F.3d 1070, 1072 (8th Cir. 2000).
192. Id.
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“symbolic expressions”193 of support; rather they are more like substantive
political statements than other’s contributions.194 Judge Arnold also suggested
that First Amendment freedoms at stake in Lamb were weightier than those
involved in Buckley because spending on its candidates is the party’s speech,
not just one avenue for the party to communicate.195 Yet, the Court in
Colorado II gave this no consideration. Instead, it upheld the distinction in
Buckley, and overlooked the idea that in an election, the parties’ right to
coordinate with their candidates entails much more than a marginal restriction
on their First Amendment freedoms.
V. THE MOST RECENT ADDITION TO CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
The 1974 Amendments to the FECA were adopted in response to the
Watergate scandal. Similarly, the collapse of Enron, a corporation that made
large and continuous contributions to both Republican and Democrat
candidates, resulted in the Congress passing, and President George W. Bush
signing, new campaign finance legislation.196 The legislation was a bipartisan
effort sponsored by Rep. Christopher Shays (R-Conn.) and Rep. Martin
Meehan (D-Mass.). The main provisions of the bill included a ban on
unregulated soft money as well as new regulations pertaining to issue ads.197
Before the most recent bill was signed into law, campaigns were financed
through both soft money and hard money.198 Hard money was used for
election activities expressly advocating the defeat or election of a specific
candidate.199 Soft money, on the other hand, was raised to support get-out-thevote efforts, party building, grass roots activities, and issue ads—those ads that
do not advocate for the election or defeat of a specific candidate.200 The FECA
originally regulated only hard money, while leaving soft money unlimited and
unregulated.201

193. Id. (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21).
194. Id.
195. See id.
196. Jill Zuckman, House OKs Bill to Ban Soft Money Donations; Measure Still Needs
Approval in Senate, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 14, 2002, at A1; see also Alison Mitchell, Campaign
Finance Bill Wins Final Approval in Congress and Bush Says He’ll Sign It, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21,
2002, at A1 (noting that “the new legislation will make the most far-ranging changes since 1974
in how political parties and outside groups participate in campaigns”).
197. Charles Lane, Court Tests Likely for Shays-Meehan; “Issue Ad” Rules Viewed as
Vulnerable, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 2002, at A4.
198. See Zuckman, supra note 196, at A1.
199. See id.
200. See id.
201. See id.
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The new campaign finance law prohibits parties from raising soft
money.202 Supporters of the law argued that the Supreme Court’s decision in
Colorado II is evidence that the Court would find a soft money ban consistent
with Buckley.203 One of the most controversial portions of the new law
prohibits certain groups from running issue ads thirty days before a primary
and sixty days before a general election.204 Those who oppose the law argue
that under Buckley the provision regarding issue ads is unconstitutional.205
As one article pointed out, there are winners and losers under the new
campaign finance laws.206 Among the winners are PACs, whose status will be
elevated because of the emphasis on smaller, regulated donations.207 Political
parties, on the other hand, are among the losers, as they will lose a large
portion of money that has financed many of their activities.208
Within hours of the President signing the bill, both the National Rifle
Association and Senator Mitch McConnell filed lawsuits challenging the
constitutionality of the law.209 Unfortunately, the opinion in Colorado II
provides little guidance to either those who support the law or those who
oppose it. While one author noted that the Supreme Court, no longer a
champion of political speech, would probably uphold the new law,210 as argued
above, the decision in Colorado II was inconsistent with the Court’s decision
in Buckley, and leaves open the question of the constitutionality of this new
campaign finance reform legislation.

202. See Mitchell, supra note 196, at A1. In exchange for the soft money ban, the limits on
hard money were loosened slightly. See id. Under the new law, individuals can give a federal
candidate $2000 as opposed to the current limit of $1000. See id. Furthermore, the aggregate
limit an individual can give to all federal candidates and political parties will rise from $25,000 a
year to $95,000 for each two-year election cycle. Id.
203. Id.
204. Alison Mitchell, House G.O.P. Proposes Rival to Campaign Finance Bill, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 13, 2002, at A26.
Lawyers on both sides of the debate say the most vulnerable part of the bill is probably its
“issue ad” provision, which applies disclosure rules and contribution limits to TV and
radio advertising—paid for by corporations, unions and independent advocacy groups—
that “refers” to federal candidates in the weeks immediately before a primary or general
election.
Lane, supra note 197, at A4.
205. See id.
206. Jim Drinkard, Some Win, Some Lose with Changes, USA TODAY, Mar. 19, 2002, at 2A.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Elisabeth Bumiller & Philip Shenon, President Signs Bill on Campaign Gifts; Begins
Money Tour, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2002, at A1.
210. D. Bruce La Pierre, Editorial, A Little Problem of Constitutionality:. . .But the Court
May Not Save the Day, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 27, 2002, at B7. Lapierre noted that
“[the Supreme Court is] ready—just like Congress and president George W. Bush—to sacrifice
some of our political freedom on the altar of post-Enron public passions.” Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
At first glance, the majority in Colorado II seemed to follow the precedent
set in Buckley; independent expenditure limitations are unconstitutional, while
those on contributions, including coordinated expenditures, are constitutional.
There was a big difference in the two cases, however: Buckley involved
individuals and political committees, while Colorado II involved a political
party. This was an important distinction, one the Court did not seem to
recognize. This failure resulted in an opinion that left much to be desired,
causing the campaign finance area to remain murky. The impact of the Court’s
inattention to these issues is that Buckley and Colorado II are inconsistent with
each other, which will ultimately lead to confusion in campaign finance laws.
Furthermore, because the Colorado II majority failed to acknowledge that
political parties are not the same as other political actors because of their
constitutional status, as well as their exceptional role in carrying out the goals
of democracy, it also did not consider the possibility that parties’ spending on
the election of its candidates is necessary if they are to fulfill those
responsibilities. While the weakest link in the Court’s decision in Colorado II
is that it failed to consider the above points, the conclusion is also the weakest
link in a long chain of Supreme Court campaign finance decisions that will
ultimately result in more confusion in this area of the law, and with the passage
of the new campaign finance legislation, that confusion is likely to come
sooner rather than later.
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